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 Introduction 
 To support clinical and translational research, the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) has established the 
Carolina Data Warehouse for Health (CDW-H), a clinical data 
warehouse holding data continuously pulled from the Electronic 
Health Record system for the UNC HealthCare System. 1 Th e 
CDW-H contains Protected Health Information (PHI) from 
patients, including lab results, physician notes, diagnoses, and 
other sensitive medical information. It is federated with several 
other data systems at UNC that contain valuable and sensitive 
patient data, such as the Lineberger Cancer Registry being built 
and maintained by the UNC Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer 
Center. NC TraCS, the holder of UNC’s National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) Clinical and Translational Science Award (CTSA), 
maintains the data warehouse and provides researchers with 
access to and help with using it. Th e CDW-H houses almost two 
billion rows of data, and on a typical day, more than one million 
data elements are added to it. Th e data that reside there represent 
an incredible opportunity for research. To date, over 700 studies 
have been based on the data provided by the CDW-H. 
 NC TraCS is tasked with both enabling and promoting 
research on data containing PHI and with ensuring such data 
are used only in accordance with University and federal policies. A 
critical concern in this dual role is ensuring that data provisioned 
to researchers remain secure, yet easy to use. Prior solutions, 
such as provisioning data to researchers through encrypted 
email or via a secured Network Attached Storage disk space, were 
deemed insecure as there was no control over what researchers 
did with the data aft er these were provisioned; e.g., nothing 
prevented researchers from emailing data to external systems to 
do work off -hours or from accidentally leaving data in nonsecure 
locations. To address this concern, NC TraCS, the Renaissance 
Computing Institute (RENCI), UNC School of Information and 
Library Science, and UNC Information Technology Services 
(ITS) prototyped and deployed a production framework called 
Secure Medical Research Workspace (SMRW). In this paper, we 
highlight the benefi ts and weaknesses of this system. 
 Methods 
 Th ree main factors drove the design for the SMRW. First, an 
analysis of Institutional Review Board (IRB)-mandated security 
requirements at UNC classifi ed studies into Levels I, II, and III, 
with Level III refl ecting the highest security needs. Th is analysis 
indicated that 27% of the 4,210 studies tabulated would require a 
Level III solution. Second, recognition from interviews with data 
security vendors and from reports on data breaches (see Table  1 ) 
that data disclosures by internal personnel are a dominant risk 
vector, especially within medicine, but that externally originating 
hacks are also important. Th ese results suggest that it is as 
important to keep institutional personnel from unintentionally 
allowing data to leave the medical research enterprise as it is to 
keep hackers from pulling data out of the enterprise. Th ird, from 
discussions with researchers and research analysts within UNC’s 
CTSA, it was decided that a high priority was to fi nd a solution 
that allows researchers to work in a “natural environment,” that 
is, an environment that they are accustomed to. 
 With the above drivers as context, the team performed 
a lightweight formal requirements analysis to arrive at the 
functional specifi cations for the system. We interviewed a set of 
researchers and institutional stakeholders and identifi ed a set of 
eight use case actors (roles) in three classes (user, user assistant, 
and administrator) performing a total of 12 use cases. Figure  1 
shows a Unifi ed Modeling Language diagram 2 of the use cases 
performed by the Researcher actor/role. From these use cases, the 
team derived a list of 15 functional “business requirements” for the 
system. Once the SMRW system architecture was fi nalized these 
business requirements were used to generate a set of evaluation 
criteria for vendor products. 3 When the system prototype was 
ready, it was tested with NC TraCS research analysts and selected 
target users for the purpose of improving usability where possible. 
 SMRW was under development for roughly 2 years. Th e 
initial phase consisted of working with users and stakeholders 
and assessment of preexisting components, with the development 
team writing prototype code for aspects of the solution that were 
unavailable off  the shelf. Th e second phase involved selecting 
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vendors, integrating technologies, and ensuring that all feature 
requirements could be met by selected vendors. Th e SMRW is 
now in production use at UNC. 
 Results 
 Figure  2 shows the conceptual high-level design of the SMRW. 
In this design, a researcher requests data from the CDW-H by 
contacting an NC TraCS research analyst, who issues a private 
SMRW “workspace” to the researcher. Th e researcher logs into 
the workspace from her local computer over a virtual private 
network connection. Th e workspace is a virtual remote desktop 
computer with analysis tools installed and a mounted drive that 
contains data requested from CDW-H. Th e researcher can bring 
any additional necessary data from her local computer into 
the workspace; however, if she attempts to take data out of the 
workspace, the SMRW system may either allow the transfer, stop 
the transfer, stop the transfer if the data meet certain conditions 
(e.g., contain social security numbers), or challenge the transfer 
based upon policy settings applied to that research project. 
Furthermore, any attempted data movement is also logged for 
future audit. Figure  3 shows the prototypical platform workfl ow 
from the point of view of the researcher. 
 SMRW’s administrative interface provides mechanisms to 
change data transfer policies and make use of audit capabilities. 
Several policies and technologies are integrated into the base 
system to ensure the data are kept secured and that researchers 
can easily work with their data. In the following, we review critical 
aspects under the assumption that the SMRW is operated with 
administrative, networking, and physical security typical of a 
modern data center (e.g., locked doors, fi rewalls). Note that this 
assumption is an integral “ingredient” in the overall security of 
the system. 
 Desktop virtualization 
 Researchers are required to use a centrally 
administered virtual machine (VM), 
which constitutes the workspace, to access 
sensitive data provisioned to them from 
the data warehouse. The workspaces 
contain preinstalled user-oriented soft ware, 
for example R, SPLUS, and SAS, and 
preinstalled administrative software 
including antimalware soft ware. Directory 
and policy services are used to further 
enforce university and IRB policies, e.g., what 
kinds of soft ware can be run and whether 
administrative access is allowed on the 
workspace. NC TraCS provisions sensitive 
data from the data warehouse to disk space 
that is mounted as a fi le system folder on the 
researcher’s workspace. Users are also allowed to mount local 
resources, such as local hard drives and printers, to the workspace 
when they connect to it. Th is ensures that users can freely copy 
data from their machines to their workspace (this ability can 
be turned off  to protect against database linkage attacks if they 
are considered a potential problem). To reduce the possibility 
of introducing malware into the workspace, researchers are, by 
default, not permitted to install soft ware (although this can be 
allowed by policy). Workspaces also update antimalware soft ware 
and are confi gured to update the operating system automatically. 
 Data leakage protection 
 Each workspace is protected by Data Leakage Protection (DLP) 
soft ware. 4 DLP comprises a suite of technology components that 
can control what data are allowed to leave a specifi c computer 
(“endpoint protection”), what data can be transferred over a 
network (“network protection”), and what data are stored within 
a set of computer resources (“discovery”). A key capability for 
the SMRW is the ability to adjust the policy for removing data 
on a project-by-project basis, with the following confi guration 
choices possible:
(1 )  Disallow any removal of data. 
(2 )   Allow removal of any data. 
(3 )   Allow removal of data only if it passes a scan of the data (e.g., 
for PHI data elements). 
(4 )   Allow removal of data only if the researcher acknowledges 
permission to do so. 
(5 )  Allow removal of data only aft er receiving permission from 
an administrator. 
 We believe choice no. 4 represents a balance between providing 
researchers with easy access to their data while still ensuring no 
data egress without an acknowledgment of responsibility. As such, 
 Percentage of breaches 
 DISC HACK INSD PHYS PORT STAT 
EDU 30.42% 32.17% 1.75% 6.35% 21.44% 7.88% 
MED 14.01% 5.10% 14.97% 14.33% 42.36% 9.24% 
 Table 1.  Results pulled from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a grant-supported nonprofi t corporation. The data include publically documented breaches from 2005 to 2012 
in the United States classifi ed the type of entity and the type of breach, and the number of records breached. The types of breaches include: DISC (unintended disclosure), 
HACK (hacking or malware), CARD (debit/credit card fraud), INSD (breach made by someone with legitimate access), PHYS (lost, discarded, or stolen nonelectronic data), 
PORT (lost, discarded, or stolen physical device), STAT (lost, discarded, stolen nonportable electronic device), and UNKN (unknown). 
 Figure 1.  Researcher use cases for SMRW. 
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in reviewing data leakage solutions, the ability to interrupt an 
attempt to remove data, present the researcher with a data use 
agreement, and require the researcher to actively acknowledge data 
removal was a key feature. Th e data leakage endpoint protection 
technology component allows the researcher to instantly give an 
acknowledgment. 
 For the SMRW, DLP client endpoint protection is present on 
each workspace provisioned to researchers and a central DLP 
server is used to administer all clients. Several additional factors 
were considered in assessing data leakage technology, including: 
(1) ability to control data being removed from the computer 
via diff erent mechanisms (e.g., fi le copy, Instant Messenger, Web 
forms, email); (2) ability to defi ne approaches used to scan the data 
(e.g., regular expression matching, fi le types, data locations, fi le 
signature); (3) ability to log all attempts to remove data, including 
logging of the data removed, as well as availability of additional 
forensics capabilities; (4) easy to use management soft ware; and 
(5) correctness under a variety of test cases (e.g., whether copying 
worked correctly when the user cancelled the copy aft er being 
challenged with the data use agreement, a scenario that more than 
one vendor solution did not pass). 
 Technical implementation 
 Th e SMRW architecture is realized by selecting and deploying 
vendor products, confi guring networking infrastructure, and 
integrating against the institution’s IT services as relevant. 5 In 
UNC’s case, virtualization capabilities are provided by VMware 
in a clustered confi guration. All researcher workspace VMs are 
behind the UNC fi rewall to protect against external network-based 
attacks such as port scanning; the SMRW network is partitioned 
into three Virtual Local Area Networks, with one containing 
researcher workspaces and two containing infrastructure services 
such as a fi le server and the DLP server node. A proxy server 
and Remote Desktop Gateway mediate interaction between the 
workspaces and the Internet. UNC’s institution-wide Active 
Directory infrastructure provides authentication as well as 
authorization policies enforced at the researchers’ workspace 
instances through Windows General Policy Objects. Each 
workspace also uses Symantec antivirus as provided by UNC 
and uses UNC’s servers for Windows operating system updates. 
Websense’s DLP product is used for the system’s DLP capabilities, 
 Figure 2.  Conceptual view of the SMRW environment. 
 Figure 3.  Workfl ow showing SMRW platform's typical (researcher) usage scenario. 
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including policy management and auditing of data access patterns 
on a per user basis. 
 Discussion 
 Evaluation 
 Th e two most crucial requirements of the SMRW environment 
are that it prevents data leakage (in accordance with policy 
settings) and that it logs attempts to move data. Th e SMRW team 
therefore tested the system for interdiction of data movement 
across monitored channels. Th ese tests showed 100% effi  cacy 
when the system was confi gured to interdict all outbound fi le 
transfers. Preliminary testing also showed excellent recognition 
of test spreadsheets and fi les that contained mocked up PHI data, 
although we did not create a test suite with comprehensive coverage 
of all possible types of PHI data. In addition, we tested the logging 
capabilities of the system and found them to be satisfactory. Th ese 
tests were suffi  cient for our purposes although additional testing 
could be undertaken for increased system hardening. 
 Benefi ts 
 Th e SMRW and other somewhat related approaches 6,7 have several 
benefi ts over alternative approaches of which we are aware. First, 
distributing sensitive data using mechanisms that do not provide 
accountability or policy-based control (e.g., distributing data 
using “fl ash drives”) is a possible alternative, although it is clearly 
the riskiest. An alternative is to use encryption “at rest” and “in 
fl ight,” which requires encryption, and encryption verifi cation, to 
be present at all endpoints. While this solution provides a greater 
degree of security, it still allows sensitive data to be exposed if an 
encrypted device is commandeered while “open,” that is, when it 
is being used to analyze data in an unencrypted form. Th e major 
DLP-based alternative to our system is to use the DLP endpoint 
on the end user devices themselves (i.e., on the laptop or desktop 
of the researcher). Our analysis determined that this was, from 
an institutional perspective, diffi  cult and presented additional 
administration burdens and licensing costs. Furthermore, this 
impedes researchers because it “locks down” their computers. It also 
puts the control point at the wrong place in the system—sensitive 
data still migrate out to nodes when the preference of the institution 
is to keep it in the data center where it is safer and easier to manage. 
 A vendor Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) could also 
be used to supply the researcher VMs used in the system. VDI 
provides each user with a consistent desktop experience across 
diff erent underlying VMs used to support user sessions. Th e 
VDI option did not satisfy a cost/benefi t analysis for UNC’s 
deployment, but may be an option in other settings. 
 Disadvantages 
 While there are clearly benefi ts to utilizing a solution like the 
SMRW, there are also drawbacks that should be considered. First, 
the cost of the infrastructure must be weighed. SMRW setup 
costs include: (1) hardware for virtualization, (2) personnel time 
to set up virtualization, (3) integration with institutional identity 
management systems (e.g., Windows Active Directory), (4) setup 
of the networking and fi rewall environment, (5) licensing costs 
for virtualization and (6) DLP products, respectively. Ongoing 
personnel time is also required for systems administration, 
monitoring DLP usage, and setting up and supporting researchers 
on the system. Second, this architecture places additional 
constraints on researchers in comparison with simply handing 
them the (possibly encrypted) data they require. 
 Conclusion 
 While SMRW has been designed to be as frictionless as possible 
for researchers to use, lower convenience is an inescapable trade-
off . Two issues arise from this point. For a system such as SMRW 
to be successful from an institutional perspective, it must be 
widely used, and thus needs to be viewed as the only sanctioned 
method of sensitive data access. Consequently, it should be 
very easy to use and present minimal barriers to even relatively 
unsophisticated computer users. We plan to issue further reports 
on user experiences, as well as data from broad use statistics, in 
a subsequent paper. 
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